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THE WORKER PARTICIPATION CONUNDRUM: DOES
PROHIBITING EMPLOYER-ASSISTED LABOR
ORGANIZATIONS PREVENT LABOR-MANAGEMENT
COOPERATION?
*

Robert B. Moberly
Abstract: Worker participation and labor-management cooperation have been important
concepts in labor relations for more than a decade. Recently, some proponents of labor
management cooperation have argued that the statutory prohibition against employer
assistance to labor organizations contained in section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations
Act has hampered the development of worker participation programs and ought to be repealed
or modified. Others are opposed both to repealing the prohibition and to labor-management
cooperation in general. This Article argues that worker participation and labor-management
cooperation are beneficial and ought to be encouraged; nonetheless, the prohibition against
employer-assisted labor organizations is important to protect against employer interference
with union organization, and ought to remain in place. The Article reviews the early cases
arising under section 8(a)(2), as well as two important recent decisions, Electromationand Du
Pont, and concludes that neither the statute nor these cases prevent the development of worker
participation programs aimed at improving productivity, quality and efficiency. The Article
concludes that proposals to amend or repeal section 8(a)(2) would lead to schemes that would
threaten employee rights, evade unionization, and seriously damage the credibility of
legitimate worker participation programs.

I.

INTRODUCTION

For more than a decade, employers, unions, governments, and others
have paid considerable attention to the development of worker
participation and labor-management cooperation programs.
These
participation programs have taken a variety of forms, including workers
on company boards of directors, worker ownership, quality of worklife
programs, quality circles, productivity gain sharing and profit sharing t
The purpose of worker participation programs is to increase the
contributions and morale of employees, thereby leading to greater worker
productivity and satisfaction. Management sometimes introduces such
* Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law. B.A., University of Wisconsin; J.D.,

University of Wisconsin Law School. The author is grateful for the research assistance of Scott
Atwood.
1. See, e.g., Robert B. Moberly, New Directions in Worker Participation and Collective
Bargaining, 87 W. Va. L. Rev. 765 (1985); Robert B. Moberly, Toward Labor-Management
Cooperation in Government, 4 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 29 (1988); State and Local LaborManagement Committee, Labor Management Cooperation in Today's Workplace: Case Studies
from the Sixth NationalLabor Management Conference,May 27-29, 1992.
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programs unilaterally; in other instances the programs are established
through collective bargaining.
Observers and critics have reacted both positively and negatively to
worker participation programs. Some proponents of such programs
argue that Congress should amend or repeal seztion 8(a)(2) of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),2 which prohibits employer
assistance to, or domination of, labor organizations, in order to
encourage the development of employee participation programs.3 Most
such advocates contend that section 8(a)(2) is outdated legislation that
advocates an adversarial relationship between labor and management.
They maintain that the modem global economy necessitates labormanagement cooperation and, therefore, cooperative programs should
not be stymied in any way. These advocates reject the notion that
employers would use such programs for reasons other than simply
increasing employee satisfaction and, ultimately, productivity.
Conversely, those who oppose amending section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA
also frequently are critical or skeptical of employer-employee
cooperation and participation efforts.4 They do not deny the contention
that section 8(a)(2) created an adversarial relationship between labor and
management. These observers advocate such a relationship. They reject
any type of cooperative program, regardless of how restricted it is,
because they view the programs as simply a form of management
usurpation of the employees' collective bargaining power.
This Article takes a different tack, arguing that employer-employee
cooperation and worker participation are beneficial and ought to be
encouraged; yet section 8(a)(2) remains a vital part of our efforts to
protect against employer interference with union organization. Tracing

2. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988).
3. See, e.g., John W. Bowers, Section 8(a)(2) and ParticipativeManagement: An Argument for
Judicialand Legislative Change in a Modern Workplace, 26 Val. U. L. Rev. 525 (1992); Shaun G.
Clarke, Note, Rethinking the Adversarial Model in Labor Relations: An Argument for Repeal of
Section 8(a)(2), 96 Yale L.. 2021 (1987); Arnold E. Perl, Employee Involvement Groups: The
Outcry Over the NLRB's Electromation Decision, 44 Lab. L.J. 195 (1993); Note, Collective
Bargainingas an IndustrialSystem: An Argument Against JudicialReiision of Section 8(a)(2) of the
NationalLaborRelations Act, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1662 (1983).
4. See, e.g., Owen E. Herrnstadt, Why Some Unions Hesitate to Participatein Labor-Management
CooperationPrograms,8 Lab. Law. 71 (1992); Thomas C. Kohler, Models of Worker Participation:
The Uncertain Significance of Section 8(a)(2), 27 B.C. L. Rev. 499 (1S86); Wilson McLeod, LaborManagement Cooperation: Competing Visions and Labor's Challerge, 12 Indus. Rel. L.J. 233
(1990).

Section 8(a)(2) and Worker Participation
section 8(a)(2) from its inception under the Wagner Acte in 1935, this
Article disputes the contention that the legislative intent underlying
section 8(a)(2) was to promote adversarialism. Rather, Congress sought
to promote cooperation through collective bargaining. Misinterpretation
of this intent has led some circuits to improperly permit employee
programs that were employer dominated.
Proponents of modification or elimination of section 8(a)(2) especially
criticize two recent NLRB cases, Electromation,Inc. v. Teamsters Local7
1049' and E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Chemical Workers Ass'n.
The critics of section 8(a)(2) contend that these cases illustrate the
shortcomings of section 8(a)(2) in the modem economy. This Article
argues that Electromation and Du Pont do not unduly restrict efforts at
employee participation. Rather, the cases restrict employers' ability to
threaten employees' legitimate right to organize.
The Article then examines the movement to amend or repeal section
8(a)(2) in light of Electromation and Du Pont. Eliminating or modifying
section 8(a)(2) as suggested by some proponents of worker participation
would allow employers to use employee participation programs as unionbusting mechanisms. At the very least, the suggested changes would
allow management to control such programs and impede employees'
right to organize, a result section 8(a)(2) was expressly designed to
prevent. This Article ultimately concludes that an unaltered section
8(a)(2) is a viable and necessary portion of the NLRA, and that Congress
should retain this section in full.8 The Article also discusses proposals
for labor reform that would encourage cooperative programs without
losing the protection that section 8(a)(2) now affords.
H.

SECTION 8(A)(2) OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
ACT

A major purpose of the 1935 Wagner Act was to curtail company
unions, commonly known as sham unions.9 Company unions were

5. 49 Stat. 449 (1935). The Wagner Act was the NLRA as originally enacted. Section 8(a)(2) has
remained unchanged despite subsequent amendments to the Act.
6. 142 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1001 (1992).
7. 143 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1121 (1993).
8. At least absent wholesale reform of the NLRA to encourage and protect greater employee
involvement and representation rights. See infra notes 189 to 191 and accompanying text.
9. Mark Barinberg, The Political Economics of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol and Workplace
Cooperation, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1379, 1386 (1993); David H. Brody, The Future of Labor-
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employee groups that employers created and dominated, with the
intention of giving employees the outward appearance that the employer
was collectively bargaining in good faith with its employees.
The initial draft of the Wagner Act contained only a ban on company
unions and the issue was "the most important substantive issue in the
political fight over the drafting and passage of the Wagner Act."'
Senator Wagner thought that employer-dominated unions constituted the
greatest obstacle to true collective bargaining." Such a union, he noted,
"makes a sham of equal bargaining power .... [O]nly representatives
who are not subservient to the employer with whom they deal can act
freely in the interest of employees." 2 Thus, the first and most important
step toward genuine collective bargaining was to abolish companydominated unions as an agency for dealing with grievances and other
conditions of employment.' 3 Senator Wagner's efforts were
memorialized in section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, which makes it an unfair
labor practice for employers to "dominate or interfere with the formation
or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or
other support to it."' 4
Early NLRB decisions defining employer domination or interference
under section 8(a)(2) involved blatant examples of employer misconduct.
Nonetheless, these decisions established the basic parameters of
employee groups that would be accepted under the Wagner Act. Three
years after the adoption of the Wagner Act, the Supreme Court decided
NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc.,'5 in which management
established an employee representation plan that was stacked with
employees it could control. Employees paid no dues to the organization.
Management established the union bylaws, which gave the company
direct control over the selection of union representalives and over union
meetings, and strongly urged employees to join the union.16 Moreover,
management essentially eliminated the employees' ability to alter the

Management Cooperative Efforts Under Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 41
Vand. L. Rev. 545, 554-55 (1988).
10. Barinberg, supra note 9, at 1386.
11. 1 Legislative History of the National Labor Relations Act 1935 15-16 (United States
Government Printing Office 1949).
12. Id.
13. See Electromation, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 1049, 142 L.R.R.M. (ENA) 1001, 1005 (1992).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988).
15. 303 U.S. 261 (1938).
16. Id. at269.

Section 8(a)(2) and Worker Participation
bylaws unilaterally, since a provision in the bylaws prescribed that all
amendments receive a two-thirds vote from the Joint Reviewing
Committee. Under the bylaws,
management determined one half of the
17
members of that committee.
Controversy arose when a few employees attempted to align the other
workers with an American Federation of Labor (AFL) affiliate. The
company actively resisted the union's organization attempts, threatening
to fire any employee that joined the union. 8 As a consequence, the AFL
affiliate filed a complaint with the NLRB against Greyhound. In the
complaint, the union maintained that Greyhound had violated section
8(a)(2) of the NLRA by dominating the employee association and by
interfering with the employees' right to organize under section 7 of the
NLRA. 19
Greyhound did not dispute the facts of the case, but maintained that
the NLRB improperly ordered the disestablishment of the representative
plan. Management contended that a finding of an unfair labor practice
and an order for the cessation of the practice were the only possible
remedies if the company was found to have violated the NLRA.2"
Greyhound disputed the board's ability to order any measures more
drastic than a cessation of the unfair labor practice.
The Court initially determined that the company Employees
Association was plainly a sham union.2' It found that management had
committed unfair labor practices when it improperly dominated and
interfered with the association.'
Such actions stymied employee
attempts to "bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing."' Consequently, the only issue was the appropriate remedy.
The Court then considered whether the board could properly
disestablish a company union. Examining the legislative history, the
17. Id.
18. Id. at 270.
19. Id. at 263. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988) provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to
the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3).
20.
21.
22.
23.

Greyhound, 303 U.S. at 264.
Id. at 270.
Id.
Id.
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Court noted that the Railway Labor Act of 1926, which permitted the
dissolution of improper labor organizations, was the basis for the
NLRA.24 Yet, the NLRA expanded the Railway Labor Act and had as a
stated purpose the promotion of equalized collective bargaining. The
Court thus concluded that Congress clearly intended to promote
disestablishment of labor organizations that management had improperly
influenced.
The Court conceded that disestablishment may not be appropriate in
every instance of employer domination. In this case, however, the
Greyhound employee association clearly warranted a disestablishment
order. Alluding to the blanket control that Greyhound wielded over the
association, the Court held that the company "by unfair labor practices,
ha[s] succeeded in establishing a company union so organized that it is
incapable of functioning as a bargaining representative of employees."2' 6
In such instances, stated the Court, the only proper alternative was to
dissolve the labor organization and begin the process anew. Employees
could then independently establish an organization that would represent
only their interests, not those of management as well.
The next year, the Supreme Court solidified its blanket prohibition of
company unions in NLRB v. Newport News Shipbu.lding and Dry Dock
Co. 2 1 In Newport News, management, with the aid of employees,
implemented an employee representation plan. 9 The stated purpose of
the plan was to give employees an avenue for the discussion of working
conditions to ameliorate future labor-management antagonism.3" This
representation took the form of joint committees. Employees elected
representatives, whom the company paid for their efforts.3" Management
personnel were not eligible for such positions, but management reserved
the right to select one half of the employee members of the joint
committees.32 Further, the joint committees could not call for arbitration
33
of disputes until the company president acceded to such a request.

24. Id. at 266.
25. Id. at 266-68.
26. Id. at 270.
27. Id. at 271.
28. 308 U.S. 241 (1939).
29. Id. at 244.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 244-45.
33. Id. at 245.

Section 8(a)(2) and Worker Participation
The original plan underwent a number of revisions during its twelve
years in existence. For example, in 1931, management replaced the
multiple joint committees with a single general joint committee.
Management then gave the general joint committee the responsibility of
dealing with grievances." Yet management retained the right to appoint
one half of the committee's members. Management also retained the
right to assert final approval of the committee's grievance decisions.3 6
Management made a final revision of the plan in 1937, after the
Supreme Court had upheld the legality of the NLRA.37 It discontinued
compensation of representatives and replaced the general joint committee
with a committee composed only of employee-elected representatives.38
Yet committee proposals could only become effective upon agreement of
the company.39 Moreover, the committee could alter its bylaws, but only
if not "disapproved by the company within fifteen days after their
passage."4
Newport News claimed that its motives in forming the union were
completely benign and that the committee was intended solely to benefit
its employees.4 The company argued that the organization had the
support of its employees.42 The company further noted that there had not
been a single work stoppage since the representative plan had been first
implemented.43 The Court, however, indicated that employer motive and
employee satisfaction are not pertinent factors in determining whether a
company union is prohibited." The Court rejected management's claim
that the plan was proper because it obviated the need for work stoppages.
The Court stated that such a consideration would only be proper if it
were part of the congressional policy underlying the NLRA. Examining
the NLRA, the Court concluded that "the statute plainly evinces a
contrary purpose, and that the board's conclusions are in accord with that
purpose."4'
34. Id.
35. Id. at 246.
36. Id.
37. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
38. Newport News, 308 U.S. at 246.
39. Id. at 247.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 248.
42. Id. at 247-48.
43. Id. at 248.
44. Id. at 251.

45. Id.
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The Court termed the true question as whether there is employer
domination or interference. The Court found such dominance and
interference in Newport News. Alluding to management's retention of
the right to reject amendments to committee bylaws, the Court
determined that on that basis alone the plan failed.46 The Court rejected
management's contention that this practice was commonly followed in
collective bargaining and therefore was appropriate in the instant
situation.4 7 Instead, the Court concluded that management's effective
control over the committee bylaws predetermined that the employees
would not have complete control over the committee. Therefore, the
plan violated the "complete freedom of action guaranteed to them by the
48
[NLRA]."
The Court further held that where an employee representation plan
previously violated the NLRA, simple revision of the plan would not
suffice. The Court supported the board's decision that plans previously
tainted by employer domination or interference should be
disestablished.49 Only with an entirely new plan, the Court concluded,
could a proper employee representation plan shed the specter of
impropriety that covered the prior plan. The Court thus found that
regardless of how innocuous the company's actions or unions appeared,
company-dominated organizations could not be allowed if the Wagner
Act's goal of promoting collective bargaining was to have a chance for
50
success.
Section 8(a)(2) remained intact despite employe.r efforts to legalize
company unions and their progeny, World War II's employee groups,5 '
in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.52 Significant questions arose, however,
concerning the precise definition of a labor organization. Section 2(5) of
46. Id. at 249.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 250.
50. Id.at250-51.
51. During World War II, Congress created the War Production Board. The board urged
cooperation between labor and management in industries critical to the war effort. Board-supported
"employee groups" and "labor management committees" worked closely with management to deal
with grievances and other employment issues. Most of these groups vialated the Wagner Act, but
wartime regulations exempted them from litigation. Following the war, some of these employee
groups remained despite the dissolution of the War Production Board.
52. Labor-Management Relations Act, ch. 120, sec. 101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947). See Note,
ParticipatoryManagement UnderSections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the NationalLabor Relations Act, 83
Mich. L. Rev. 1736, 1766-67 (1985); see generally Archibald Cox, SIome Aspects of the Labor
ManagementRelationsAct, 1947, 61 Harv.L. Rev. 1 (1947-48).

Section 8(a)(2) and Worker Participation
the Wagner Act defines a labor organization as "any organization of any
kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in
which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole
or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of
work."53 The primary point of contention was the point at which an
employee group was transformed into a labor organization that
represented the interests of all the employees. The term "dealing with
employers" was at the core of the confusion. It was unclear whether
such dealing could only occur in bilateral discussions, or if it was even
further confined to official collective bargaining activities. The import
of the distinction between employee groups that were and were not labor
organizations was that only labor organizations were subject to the
strictures of section 8(a)(2).
Management preferred a narrow
interpretation of "dealing with" because employer-assisted or -dominated
employee representation plans would be more likely to gain judicial
sanction.
The Supreme Court finally addressed the issue of labor organizations
in NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co. 4 The employee representative committee
at issue in Cabot Carbon was a remnant World War II employee group.
Membership on the committee was restricted solely to employees, who
were paid for time spent performing committee work. 6 Management,
with employee input, established the committee's bylaws,5 7 paid all of
the committee's expenses, and provided clerical support."
The committee never represented employees as their collective
bargaining agent with management. Rather, the committee's purpose
was to facilitate discussion of employee concerns. Grievances and most
other areas mentioned in section 2(5) were frequent topics of
discussion. 9
The committee then made recommendations to
management suggesting appropriate remedies for these concerns.
Management was not required to accept the group's recommendations,

53. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1988).
54. 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
55. Id. at 205.
56. Id. at 206. Such committees existed at each of Cabot Carbon's several plants. Id. at 204.
57. Id. at 205.
58. Id. at 209.
59. Id. at 207. Discussions included "seniority, job classifications, job bidding, makeup time,
overtime records, time cards, a merit system, wage corrections, working schedules, holidays,
vacations, sick leave, and improvement of working facilities and conditions." Id.
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although it frequently adopted the committee's proposals.6" Cabot
Carbon also provided support and assistance to the committee.61 A union
coexisted with the employee group at approximately one third of Cabot
Carbon's plants.62 The union eventually filed a complaint, maintaining
that the employee committee was a section 2(5) labor organization and
consequently accusing the employer of section 8(a)(2) violations.63
The Court held that the committee was a labor organization under the
provisions of section 2(5). The Court rejected management's contention
that the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 had exempted such groups from section
2(5) analysis, noting that the provisions to that effect had not survived
the joint houses of Congress." Instead, the Court based its holding on
the fact that the committee and management discussed topics specifically
mentioned in section 2(5).65 As such the committee was "dealing with"
management.
Management contended that because no colleclive bargaining was
taking place, the committee could not be statutorily "dealing with" the
employer.66 The Court, however, rejected this narrow interpretation, and
concluded that the committee need not have been bargaining with Cabot
Carbon in the "usual concept of collective bargaining,"'67 in order to
establish a section 2(5) labor organization. The committee could not
unilaterally implement any of the recommendations it made on the
section 2(5) enumerated topics. Management maintained control over
the discussions and impeded the independence of the employee
committee. Thus, the Court concluded that the committee was a labor
organization even if it only discussed and then made proposals and
requests concerning "grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay,
hours of employment, or conditions of work."68 In fact, noted the Court,
only one of the section 2(5) enumerated topics need be shown to have
been addressed to constitute a labor organization. The Court, therefore,
expanded the purview of section 2(5), holding that actual bilateral
negotiation was not a prerequisite for an employee committee to be

60. Id. at 207-08.
61. Id. at 209.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 206-07.
64. Id. at 215-17.
65. Id. at 213.
66. Id. at214.
67. Meaning bilateral negotiation. Id.
68. Id. at212-13.

Section 8(a)(2) and Worker Participation
deemed a labor organization. Rather, the Court concluded that it would
suffice for section 2(5) purposes if an employee committee merely
discussed and made recommendations on any of the topics specifically
mentioned in section 2(5).69
A majority of the circuits have followed the Cabot Carbon view that
any employee committee that offers requests or recommendations to
management on any issue enumerated in section 2(5) is deemed a labor
organization. A minority of circuits, however, have narrowly interpreted
the Cabot Carbon analysis and effectively have used employer motive
and employee satisfaction as determining factors on the question of
whether section 8(a)(2) was violated." Some courts have also concluded
that actual rather than potential domination needs to be shown."
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Chicago Rawhide Manufacturing
Co. v. NLRB72 was the first to proffer a version of this alternative view.
In Rawhide, the court disregarded the specific language of the Supreme
Court in Newport News by using employer motive and employee
satisfaction as determining factors on the question of whethei section
8(a)(2) was violated.73 The court also concluded that actual rather than
potential domination needed to be shown. 74 This reasoning did have
some allure to it, especially considering the perceived harshness of Cabot
Carbon. Other courts therefore followed Rawhide's lead.
The Sixth Circuit's 1982 decision in NLRB v. Streamway Division of
the Scott & Fetzer Company7 5 acknowledged Cabot Carbon and then
limited its holding. The court concluded that Cabot Carbon's broad
view of the term "dealing with" management "did not indicate the
76
limitations, if any, upon the meaning of 'dealing' under the statute."
The court therefore held that the issue of the amount of interaction
required for dealing was unsettled, and thus sought to answer the
question in the context of the facts of the instant case.

69. Id. at213-14.
70. NLRB v. Streamway Div. of the Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982); Hertzka &
Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974); Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d
165 (7th Cir. 1955).
71. See Streamway, 691 F.2d at 295.
72. 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955).
73. Id. at 170.
74. Id. at 167-68.
75. 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982).
76. Id. at 292.
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Streamway organized and established an In-plant Representation
Committee. The purpose of the committee was to promote labormanagement relations by "communicating Company plans and
programs; defining and identifying problem areas and eliciting
suggestions and ideas for improving operations.""7 The committee was
composed solely of employees, but management was present at all of the
meetings. 8 Moreover, membership on the committees was fluid, with
members continuously rotated so that all employees had the opportunity
to serve. 79 The court observed that the company c[early dominated the
committee, but noted that the threshold question for a section 8(a)(2)
analysis was whether the committee was a labor organization.8"
The Sixth Circuit found that the committee was riot the type of group
that Congress envisioned when it defined labor organizations in section
2(5).8' The court stated that the continuous rotation of members
indicated that the employees were acting more on an individual basis
than on a company wide representational basis.82 Moreover, the court
concluded that the lack of anti-union animus was a factor.8 3 The primary
basis for the court's decision, though, was that there was "no evidence
that anyone viewed the committee as more than a communicative
device." 4
The court observed that section 2(5) did not prohibit communication
between employees and management. Rather, the court concluded that
such communication was appropriate if the existence of the committee
did not inhibit the collective bargaining ability of the employees."
According to the court, the employees had simply chosen a less
formalistic and adversarial approach of ccmmunicating with
management.8 6 The employees had voluntarily chosen to dispense with
formal collective bargaining.
Consequently, the court found
Streamway's employee committee not a section 2(5) labor organization
and never reached the section 8(a)(2) question.

77. Id. at 289.
78. Id. at 289-90.
79. Id. at 290.
80. Id. at291.
81. Id. at 295.
82. Id. at 294-95.
83. Id. at 295.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.

Section 8(a)(2) and Worker Participation
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB"'
completely ignored the Cabot Carbon section 2(5) distinction and
focused instead on employer domination or interference under section
8(a)(2). The employees in Hertzka voted to decertify their union. 8 Prior
to the decertification election, management allegedly made threats of
reprisal against employees supporting the union.
Thereafter,
management called a meeting and, at the suggestion of one of the
employees, developed employee committees.8 9 At the request of the
employees, the committees included a management representative,
whose purpose was to reduce the "tedious process" of negotiation." The
management representatives had a vote on some, but not all, of the
committees. The committees sometimes held their meetings on companyr
premises during work hours.9
The committees then formulated
proposals for management to review.
The union consequently accused management of section 8(a)(1)92 and
section 8(a)(2) violations. The Ninth Circuit quickly upheld the section
8(a)(1) violation based on the threats of reprisal against employees.9 3
The court then turned to the 8(a)(2) question and first examined the
legislative history of the NLRA. Citing Senator Wagner, the court
concluded that the NLRA permitted direct relations with the employer
provided that management did not control the relations to such an extent
that the group was essentially a sham.94 The court observed that under a
strict reading of section 8(a)(2), virtually all employer-employee
relations could be deemed improper.95 The court found such a
conclusion unacceptable.
The Ninth Circuit castigated those who adopted the "myopic" view
that only adversarial relations were acceptable.9 6 The court held that the
section 8(a)(2) impropriety hinged on whether the employees exercised

87. 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974).
88. Id. at 626.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 629.
91. Id.
92. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1988) provides that "[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 7." See supra note 19 for text of section 7.
93. Hertzka, 503 F.2d at 628-29.
94. Id. at 630.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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their "free choice" in creating and accepting the employee committee.9 7
Consequently, the court concluded that "[w]here a cooperative
arrangement reflects a choice freely arrived at and where the
organization is capable of being a meaningful avenue for the expression
of employee wishes, we find it unobjectionable under the Act." 98
Referring to the instant case, the court found the employee committee
The court
to constitute allowable employer-employee relations.
determined that the employees had exercised their "freedom of choice"
in selecting the type of bargaining unit they desired. 9 Management was
active in the group, but the court found this acceptable because the idea
came from employees rather than management.' 00 The court also did not
deem it dispositive that the committee met on firm premises during firm
time. 101 Moreover, even though management representatives could vote
and express their opinions, the court decided that the company did not
exercise any control over the organization's bylaws or functions.'
Thus, the Ninth Circuit is one of a minority of circuits that have narrowly
interpreted Cabot Carbon and have used employer motive, employee
satisfaction, or actual versus potential domination as determining factors
on the question of whether section 8(a)(2) was violated.
The NLRB has not accepted the analyses of the minority circuits.
Rather, like the majority of circuits, it has applied a fairly strict test to
employee representation plans and has been unwilling to read Cabot
Carbon's holding narrowly. This approach has been criticized as
nostalgia and as an impediment to change in the modern workplace. 10 3
But the board has upheld a number of worker participation programs and
has indicated it is not adverse to the recent proliferation of quality of
worklife and other employee participation programs.
Perhaps the most far-reaching board decision was Sparks Nugget,
In Sparks Nugget, the board determined that an employee
Inc.'
committee established by management to resolve grievances was not a
97. Id.
98. Id. at 631.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. The Ninth Circuit based this conclusion on the fact that there was no evidence of "actual
interference" with employee rights and that the management representative could easily be out voted
by the employees on the committee. Id.
103. See Quality Circle Busters, Wall St. J., June 9, 1993, at A12 (referring to the NLRB as "an
antique New Deal agency that can't seem to get its mind around the modem economy").
104. 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1298 (1977).
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labor organization because it was actually adjudicatory in nature.
Management unilaterally proposed and created an "impartial" Employee
Council, which had three members: one employee representative elected
by the employees and two management members. Management's
director of employee relations chaired the council. 10 5 Its purpose was to
resolve grievances, rather than proposing solutions for management's
review, and all decisions of the committee were final. The union filed
charges against Sparks Nugget, maintaining, among other things, that the
Employee Council was a section 2(5) labor organization that was
violative of section 8(a)(2).
The board first addressed the threshold question of whether the
Employee Council was a labor organization. Referring to Cabot Carbon,
the board conceded that "dealing with" encompassed more than pure
Yet the board concluded that a labor
collective bargaining." 6
organization must act in some sense as an employee advocate.
Otherwise, the organization could not "deal with" management in a
bilateral process.'0 7
Turning to the facts, the board rejected the contention that the
Employee Council acted in a representational capacity for employees.
Rather, the council performed a solely adjudicatory function for
management.0 8 Noting that the council had never initiated grievances,
recommended changes in terms or conditions of work, or acted in any
manner as an employee advocate, the board held that the Employee
Council was not within the statutory meaning of a labor organization.0 9
As such, the board never reached the section 8(a)(2) question and
deemed the Employee Council a legitimate entity.
Section 8(a)(2) has effectively achieved its goal of eliminating
traditional company unions. The courts and NLRB now rarely hear cases
where the employer has established a company union of the sort
addressed in Greyhound and Newport News. Yet the concern over
company unions is not a moot point. While usually less overt, employee
participation programs foster the same concerns of employer domination
or interference that section 8(a)(2) was intended to counter. These
programs frequently straddle or even clearly cross the line into

105. Id. at 1300.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1300-01.
Id. at 1300.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 69:331, 1994

mandatory subjects of bargaining. Moreover, these same programs are
almost exclusively management initiated.
The changing economic environment presents both the courts and the
NLRB with a conundrum. Certainly they do not want to unnecessarily
disadvantage American industry. On the other hand, neither do they
want employers to be able to exploit the use of employee participation
programs and circumvent section 8(a)(2) simply by proclaiming the need
for American competitiveness. This background sets the stage for the
NLRB's recent decision to hear two cases, one union and one non-union,
in which the NLRB attempted to clarify the tests for the validity of
employee participation programs.
III.

CURRENT STATUS OF SECTION 8(A)(2):
ELECTR OMA TION AND D U PONTEXAMIN-ED

The National Labor Relations Board recently decided two cases that
directly addressed section 8(a)(2) and worker participation issues.
Electromation, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 1049,110 arose in a non-union
setting while E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Chemical Workers
Ass'n 1 ' arose in a unionized workplace. The cases were highly
publicized in advance as landmark cases.
A.

Electromation, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 1049

Electromation manufactured electrical components with about 200
employees. The company was not unionized at the time in question."' In
1988, Electromation decided to cut expenses by a'.tering the employee
attendance bonus policy and, in lieu of a wage increase for 1989,
distributing a lump-sum payment based on length of service. Employees
were displeased with this reduction in benefits and, in January 1989, 68
employees signed a petition expressing dissatisfaction with the new
attendance policy. The company president then met with a group of
eight management-selected employees. The group discussed a number
of issues, including wages, bonuses, incentive pay, attendance pay
programs, and leave policy (all of which are conditions of employment).
Management then proposed establishing "action committees" as a

110. 142 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1001 (1992).
111. 143 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1121 (1993).
112. Electromation, 142 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1003.
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method of involving employees." 3 After the management met again
with the same eight employees, the company announced five action
committees in the areas of 1) absenteeism-infractions, 2) no smoking
policy, 3) communication network, 4) pay progression for premium
positions, and 5) attendance bonus program." 4 The company posted
sign-up sheets for the action committees, each of which consisted of six
employees and one or two members of management, as well as the
benefits manager who coordinated all the action committees. No
employees were involved in drafting the policy goals expressed in the
sign-up sheets, and the company determined the number of employees on
each of the action committees. After the committees were organized, the
company posted a notice to all employees announcing the members of
each committee. The management coordinator testified that the posting
was to ensure that anyone who wanted to know what was happening
5
should contact the people on the action committees."
The action committees began meeting in late January and early
February of 1989, and scheduled weekly meetings in conference rooms
on the company premises. Management representatives participated in
these meetings, and a manager facilitated the discussions. The company
paid employees for their time spent participating in committee meetings
and also supplied necessary materials. 6
Contemporaneous with the establishment of the employee committees,
a local affiliate of the Teamsters launched an organizing drive. The
record was unclear as to whether the union's efforts actually predated the
creation of the employee committees. In any event, there was no
evidence that the company was aware of the union's organizing efforts
until February 13, when the union sought recognition. 7 The company
immediately informed employees that it would be unable to participate in
subsequent committee meetings, and that the company could not work
with the committees until after the union election." 8
Prior to representation, the union charged that the employee
committees violated section 8(a)(2) and requested their disestablishment.
113. Id.
114. Id.

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1004.

118. Id. The union lost the election and immediately filed a complaint alleging that the employee
committees unfairly affected the election. Electromation, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 1049, No. 25-CA19818, 1992 WL 386692, at *34 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 16, 1992). The ALJ agreed and ordered new
elections. Id. at *55-*56.
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An
The NLRB thereafter issued a complaint to that effect.1 9
administrative trial judge found that the action committees constituted a
labor organization within the meaning of section 2(5) because
employees, supervisors, and managers served as committee members and
their discussions concerned conditions of employment. 2 The judge also
found that the company dominated and interfered with the committees
because it organized the committees, created their nature and structure,
Therefore, the administrative judge
and determined their functions.'
concluded that the action committees violated section 8(a)(2).
On appeal, the board scheduled oral argument, usually reserved for
significant cases, and framed the pertinent issues as: 1) at what point
does an employee committee lose its protection as a communication
device and become a labor organization, and 2) what conduct of an
employer constitutes domination or interference with the employeremployee committee?.. In the majority opinion, however, the board
As an
restricted its holding to the specific facts of this case.'
introduction to its analysis, the board pointed out that the statutory
language standing alone was insufficient to determine whether the statute
should apply to particular facts.'24 Therefore, it sought guidance from
legislative history to determine what kind of activity Congress intended
to prohibit. 5 In the board's view, the legislative history revealed that
the prohibition against company-dominated labor organizations was a
critical part of Senator Wagner's goal of eliminating industrial strife
through encouraging collective bargaining.'2 6 Senator Wagner wanted to
include not only those groups that were highly organized, such as labor
unions, but also those groups that were only loosely organized
Because he intended to eliminate
representation committees. 7
employer-dominated unions, and to avoid creating a loophole that could

119. Id. at *34.
120. Electromation, 142 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1004.
121. Id. The judge also noted that the meetings took place on company property, supplies and
materials were provided by management, and members were paid for time spent on committee work.
Id.
122. Id. at 1002.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1004.
125. Id.
126. Id.; see supranotes 11-14 and accompanying text.
127. Electromation, 142 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1005. The latter group was a prevalent form of
company union at the time the Wagner Act was passed. Id.
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conceivably emasculate the entire
act, Senator Wagner defined the term
128
broadly.
organization"
"labor
The NLRB further explored the legislative history with respect to the
type of employer conduct that Congress intended section 8(a)(2) to
prohibit. Of particular import were the revisions to the Wagner bill as it
made its way through the legislative process. The original proposal
prohibited any employer involvement at all. A later version substituted
the words "dominate or interfere with the formation or administration"
for "initiate, participate in, supervise, or influence."' 29 The board noted
that the change emanated from Congress's acceptance that some
employer-employee interaction was positive because such interaction
frequently worked toward industrial peace. 3 Yet it also observed that
Congress maintained a fairly strict restriction on employer involvement
because there was a consensus that most employer involvement,
especially at the formation stage, was fatal to the employee group's
independence. 3 ' The board concluded that by prohibiting domination,
interference, or assistance, Congress intended to provide a broad
assurance that employee groups would be protected in their freedom to
act independently of employers when representing employee interests. 32
Going on to the merits, the NLRB first considered whether the action
committees were labor organizations under section 2(5). 131
The
organization is a labor organization, said the board, if 1) employees
participate, 2) the organization exists, at least in part, for the purpose of
"dealing" with employers, and 3) those dealings concerned "conditions
of work" or other statutory subjects. 3 Further, if the organization has as
a purpose the representation of employees, it meets the statutory
definition of "employee representation committee plan" under section

2(5). 13

128. Id. Additionally, the board noted that Professor Edwin Witte of the University of Wisconsin,
a prominent labor economist, was also influential in securing a broad definition of "labor
organization." He wanted to include the most prevalent form of company-dominated union, the
employee representation committee, including those committees that merely "deal" or "adjust." Id.
See generally Barinberg, supra note 9 (establishing the intention of the fiamers to create a broad
definition of "labor organization").
129. Electromation, 142 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1005.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1005-06.
133. Eleetromation, 142 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1006.
134. Id.
135. Id. The majority opinion, because it found that the employee members of the action
committees acted in a representational capacity, expressly declined to determine whether an
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The board noted that the Supreme Court broadly defined "dealing
with" in Cabot Carbon.136 Nonetheless, some unilateral mechanisms,
such as suggestion boxes or brainstorming groups or other information
exchanges, do not constitute "dealing with." Rather, "dealing with"
contemplates a bilateral mechanism involving proposals from the
employee committee concerning statutory subjects, coupled with real or
apparent consideration of those proposals by management. 3' The
organization could escape the "dealing with" label if it is limited to
performing essentially a managerial or adjudicative function, such as
deciding employees' complaints without dealing or interacting with the
38
employer.1
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, the board first
found that Electromation's action committees were labor
organizations. 39 This conclusion was based on four findings. First,
there was no dispute that employees participated in tile group. 4 ' Second,
the committees were actively "dealing with" management by sending
proposals to management for consideration. 4 ' Third, the subject matter
of the dealing, which included treatment of employee absenteeism and
bonuses and other monetary incentives, clearly concerned conditions of
employment. 42 Fourth, the employees acted in a representational
capacity, since they were to talk back and forth with other employees and
get ideas from other employees regarding solutions that would satisfy the
employees as a whole.
The board concluded that a purpose of the action committees, in fact
their only purpose, was to address employee dissatisfaction by creating a
bilateral process to reach bilateral solutions on the basis of employee

employee group could ever be found to constitute a labor organization without a finding that it acted
as a representative of other employees. Id. at 1006 n.20. The majority noted that member Devaney,
who separately concurred, would have reached that issue. Id. Devaney concluded that such a
finding is necessary to find that a group is a labor organization within the meaning of section 2(5).
Id. Thus it appears that this remains an open issue.
136. Id. at 1006-07.
137. Id. at 1006 n.21.
138. Id. at 1007.
139. Id. at 1008.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1009.
142. Id. at 1008.
143. Id. at 1008-09.

350

Section 8(a)(2) and Worker Participation
proposals.'" The company did not limit the purpose of the action
committees to achieving "quality" or "efficiency," and did not design the
committees to be solely a "communication device" to promote efficiency
or quality.'4 5 Thus the board did not reach the question of whether an
employer-initiated committee existing for quality, efficiency, or
communication purposes may constitute a labor organization under
section 2(5).146
After concluding that the action committees were labor organizations,
the board determined that the employer's conduct constituted domination
in the formation and organization of the labor organization, in violation
of section 8(a)(2). It was the company's idea to create the action
committees. The company drafted the purposes and goals of the
committees, which defined and limited the subject matter to be covered
by each committee. The company determined how many members
would comprise a committee and that an employee can serve on only one
committee, it appointed management representatives to the committees to
facilitate discussions, and it contributed financial and other support, such
as time to serve on the committees. On this record, the board concluded
that the company dominated the action committees in their formation and
administration, and unlawfully supported them.'47 The purpose of the
action committees was not to enable management and employees to
cooperate to improve quality or efficiency, but rather to create an
impression that disagreements were being resolved bilaterally, when in
fact the company imposed on employees its own unilateral form of
48
bargaining or dealing.'
Members Devaney and Oviatt made it clear in their concurring
opinions that quality of worklife programs would be permissible, so long
as they do not impair the right of the employees to free choice of a
bargaining representative.'" 9 Member Oviatt noted that the conduct in
Electromation was "garden variety 8(a)(2) conduct,""'5 but nonetheless
expressed approval for a broad spectrum of worker participation
144. Id. at 1009.
145. Id. at n.28.
146. Id. However, the concurring opinions of members Devaney and Oviatt clearly did not view
such committees as labor organizations. Id. at 1010, 1015. Member Oviatt unequivocally noted
"[t]he statute does not forbid direct communication between the employer and its employees to
address and solve significant productivity and efficiency problems in the workplace." Id. at 1015.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 1010.
Id.
Id. at 1010, 1015.
Id. at 1015n.2.
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programs such as quality circles and quality of work programs that draw
Oviatt observed that the board has
on the creativity of employees.'
upheld self-regulating employee teams that are given unilateral power
Member Devaney further stated that neither
over their job duties.'
Congress nor the Supreme Court had ever indicated that employee
participation programs geared solely toward safety and productivity were
impermissible.'53
In summary, the board unanimously agreed that employee
participation groups that deal with management on conditions of
employment are unlawful when set up and dominated by management.
The NLRB's decision in Electromation should not be surprising.
Contrary to critical editorial opinion from the Wall Street Journal, 5 4 the
ruling does not outlaw most existing employee participation programs
that are aimed at productivity and efficiency. The case does not prohibit
productivity teams, quality circles, quality of worklife programs, or other
legitimate worker participation efforts. Quality circles and work teams
may address the production process and efficiency concerns, but must
not be used for employee representation concerning conditions of
employment. These plans must not usurp the rights of employees to pick
their own representatives by giving employees the illusion of a
Worker
bargaining representative without the reality of one.
participation programs are likely to continue unharmed to the extent that
they deal with improving quality, productivity, or matters such as
customer relations, rather than working conditions. The case reaffirms
the protections of labor organizations and employees, without impairing
legitimate worker participation efforts.
B.

E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Chemical Workers Ass'n

The NLRB issued its decision in E.I.
Chemical Workers Ass'n 155 in May
Electromation. Du Pont is a diverse
chemicals. Its Deep Water, New Jersey

Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
1993, just six months after
corporation that specializes in
plant employs more than 3,500

151. Id. at 1015. A third concurring opinion by member Raudabaugh completely disregarded the
Supreme Court's opinion in Cabot Carbon,id. at 1023-25, and seemed to have very little credibility
with any of the other board members. Sse id. at 1007, nn. 23-24; 1016 n.5.
152. Id. at 1015.
153. Id. at 1012.
154. Quality Circle Busters, Wall St. J., June 9, 1993, at A12.
155. 143 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1121 (1993).
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persons.5 6 Unlike Electromation, Du Pont was unionized," 7 and the
Chemical Workers Association ("union") had been active at Deep Water
for about 50 years representing the plant's clerical, production and
maintenance employees. 8
In 1984, Du Pont began experimenting with cooperative programs." 9
The company established a number of committees, which included
management as well as bargaining unit employees. 6 Employees and
management representatives discussed "conditions of work" such as
safety and incentive awards, and benefits such as employee picnic areas
and jogging tracks.' 6 ' Decisions were made by consensus. 62
A major question was whether the committees existed, at least in part,
for the purpose of "dealing with" the employer. 61 The board made it
clear that there is room for lawful cooperation under the act, specifically
listing brainstorming groups, information sharing groups, and suggestion
boxes as legitimate activities not involving the bilateral mechanism of
"dealing with" the employer.'" The board noted that committees could
exist for the purpose of planning educational programs without there
being dealing. 65 The Du Pont committees, however, went much further.
Because management representatives interacted with employee
committee members under rules of consensus decision-making, the
management could reject employee proposals. Therefore, the board
found that there was dealing within the meaning of Section 2(5). 16
Moreover, the board found that management dominated the
administration of these committees. 167 Management retained veto power
over any committee action because decisions were by consensus. In
156. Id. at 1128.
157. Id. at 1123.
158. Id. at 1128.
159. Id.
160. Bargaining unit employees are those employees that are represented by the union.
161. DuPont,143 L.R.RIM. (BNA) at 1123.
162. Id. at 1124.
163. Id. at 1123.
164. Id. at 1124.
165. Id.
166. Id. The board also concluded that there would be no "dealing with" management if the
committee were governed by majority decision making, management representatives were in the
minority, and the committee had the power to decide matters for itself, rather than simply make
proposals to management. There also would be no "dealing" if management representatives
participated on the committee as observers or facilitators without the right to vote on the committee
proposals. Id.
167. Id. at 1125.
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addition, a management member served as either the leader or the
resource person in each committee, and therefore had a key role in
establishing the agenda for each meeting and in conducting the meeting.
Management also controlled how many employees could serve on the
committee, and which employee volunteer would be selected if there
were an excess number of volunteers. The employees had no voice in
determining any aspect of the composition, structure, or operation of the
committees. Moreover, management could change or abolish any of the
committees at will. This established that the company dominated the
administration of the committees in violation of section 8(a)(2). 6 '
Unlike Electromation, Du Pont involved the additional question of
whether management violated its duty to bargain under section 8(a)(5) of
the NLRA'69 by holding safety conferences, 170 as well as by establishing
The board held that the safety
safety and fitness committees.
conferences amounted to brainstorming and information sharing, and
noted that nothing in the NLRA prevents an employer from encouraging
its employees to express their ideas or to become more aware of safety
problems in their work."' Management did not establish the conferences
to act as a bilateral mechanism to make specific prop sals and to respond
to them. 7 ' Thus the board set forth the safety conferences as a labormanagement cooperation technique that would be permissible under the
NLRA.
In contrast, the safety and fitness committees did not separate their
activities from those properly within the union's authority. 7 ' Some
committees dealt with issues identical to those with which the union
dealt, and in fact brought about resolutions that the union had attempted
and failed to achieve, such as a new welding shop, a recreation area with
picnic tables and other amenities, and, as previously noted, incentive
awards. 74 Thus, in addition to violating section 8(a)(2), the company
bypassed the recognized labor union in violation of section 8(a)(5).

168. Id.
169. Under section 8(a)(5), it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988).
170. The stated purpose of the conferences was to "increase personal commitment, responsibility
and acceptance of safety as our #1 concern." Du Pont, 143 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1125.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1126.
174. Id.
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Following Du Pont, the Wall Street Journal proclaimed the NLRB the
"quality circle busters," ' while the New York Times reported that
"employers, lawyers, and business trade associations expressed dismay"
about the decision.1 76 Such commentators would have one believe that
Du Pont was merely attempting to improve worker productivity and
company efficiency. If this were true, the committees probably would
have withstood scrutiny. Nothing in the opinion indicates that quality of
worklife programs that concern themselves solely with production and
efficiency are unacceptable. The committees involved in Du Pont were
far more wide-ranging. These committees were used, as is common in
company union situations, to place mandatory subjects of bargaining
before company-dominated groups. Supposed employee committees
supplanted the union and were actually controlled to some degree by
management, while the authorized representatives of the employees, the
recognized union, was made even weaker. In this way, the company
avoided dealing with the lawfully recognized independent union on the
subjects. These were precisely the evils that Senator Wagner was aiming
at in section 8(a)(2), 177 and this case demonstrated that these evils still
exist.
Relaxation of protection against company unions would only result in
further diminution of the bargaining power and effectiveness of lawfullyrecognized unions. Without section 8(a)(2), some employers doubtless
would attempt to retain as much control as possible over so-called
cooperative programs. Labor-management cooperation programs (or
jointness programs) 178 often serve an important function even in
unionized workplaces, but they should be negotiated with the union
when they involve conditions of employment. Certainly there is no lack
of examples of successful cooperative programs that major employers
and unions in the United States have negotiated.'79 Such agreements
175. See Quality Circle Busters, Wall St. J., June 9, 1993, at A12.
176. Barbara Presley Noble, Worker-ParticipationProgramsAre FoundIllegal, N.Y. Times, June
8, 1993, at A22.
177. See Barinberg, supranote 9 and accompanying text.
178. The term "jointness" is preferred by some, to indicate a coming together of equals for mutual
benefit. See Julius Getman & F. Ray Marshal, Industrial Relations in Transition: The Paper
Industry Example, 102 Yale L.J. 1803, 1805 (1993).
179. See, e.g., Michael Belzer, Strategic Bargaining and Information Exchange: An American
Version of Co-Determination?(Sept., 1993) (unpublished manuscript on file with Washington Law
Review) (describing agreements between Ford Motor Company and the United Auto workers;
American Telephone and Telegraph and the Communication Workers of America; Bell South and
the Communication Workers of America; Champion International and the Paperworkers Union; and
basic steel companies and the United Steelworkers of America). See generally Moberly, New
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normally contain certain negotiated principles, including a joint
determination of the goals of the program, the sharing of information, a
clear indication that the program serves as a supplement to, rather than
substitute for, collective bargaining, certain expresse-d indicia of mutual
respect and trust, and further statements of support and leadership from
both top management and union representatives. 8
The board recognizes the importance of cooperative efforts, such as
quality of worklife programs. Productivity and efficiency issues clearly
are legitimate subjects for employee committees. At Du Pont, however,
management used the committees to undermine the union's
representational capacity, rather than to truly cooperate. The Wall Street
Journal scoffed at this idea, sarcastically remarking that the committees
obtained a picnic area and "the union had promised picnic tables too, but
The implication was that the union was
never delivered."'8 1
lackadaisical. In reality, the union had repeatedly been turned down on
the picnic tables.182 By granting the committees benefits that the
company denied through collective bargaining, management used the
committees to undermine collective bargaining. The effect of such
conduct, if allowed to continue, would be to diminish union power even
further and clearly establish management as the dorainant party in labor
relations.
IV. PROPOSALS TO AMEND OR REPEAL SECTION 8(A)(2)
There are numerous proposals to amend or repeal section 8(a)(2).
These include recent congressional proposals reacting to Electromation
and Du Pont, and potential proposals by the recently established
83
Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations.
"
and Senator
In March 1993, Representative Gunderson 84
8
Kassenbaum"' introduced legislation amending section 8(a)(2). Under
this amendment an employer could establish or assi3t an organization of

Directions in Worker Participationand Collective Bargaining,supra note 1; Moberly, Toward
Labor-ManagementCooperationin Government,supra, note 1.
180. See generally Moberly, New Directionsin Worker Participatiorand Collective Bargaining,
supra note 1; Moberly, TowardLabor-ManagementCooperationin Government,supra, note 1.
181. Quality Circle Busters, Wall St. J., June 6, 1993, at A12.
182.
183.
184.
185.

DuPont, 143 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1126.
See United States Department of Labor Press Release USDL 93-105 (Mar. 24, 1993).
H.R. 1529, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
Sess. (1993).
S.669, 103d Cong., Ist
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employees, and discuss matters of mutual interest with it, so long as the
organization does not have authority for a collective bargaining
agreement. This amendment apparently would allow the employerdominated committees in both Electromation and Du Pont. Some have
justified this proposal by arguing that the Wagner Act was established
for, and only contemplates, an adversarial model of labor management
relations; accordingly, the section must be altered to reflect the changing
times.'86 This is, however, clearly inaccurate. Recent work shows
conclusively that Senator Wagner in fact had as his primary goal creating
a system in which employers and independent unions would be able to
cooperate through collective bargaining to create a more stable and
productive work environment.'87
Of course, collective bargaining will not always be a cooperative
enterprise; as in any form of negotiation or bargaining, there will be
adversarial or positional examples as well as examples of cooperation.
Indeed, there is likely to be a continuum of behavior from a cooperative
to a competitive or adversarial stance, depending on the bargaining
relationship and many other factors.
In many cases, deep-seated
employer resistance has prevented the system from becoming as
cooperative as intended. t8 Nonetheless, nothing in the legislative history
or experience of section 8(a)(2) requires an interpretation that prohibits
cooperative efforts.
Nor do Electromation and Du Pont prohibit worker participation
programs. To the contrary, the majority and concurring opinions support
such programs when limited to productivity, quality and efficiency, or
when negotiated through collective bargaining. Thus, no NLRB or court
decision has struck down a properly limited employee participation
program. On the other hand, eliminating section 8(a)(2), or drastically
amending it, would seriously threaten employees' right to organize and
engage in collective bargaining, as recognized by Senator Wagner in
1935. Such removal or amendment would lead to the creation of
participation schemes designed, at least in part, to avoid, break, or evade

186. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
187. See Barinberg, supra note 9 and accompanying text. This has also been noted by Professor
Cox and his co-authors, who state: "[T]he Wagner Act . . . embodied a conscious, carefully
articulated program for minimizing labor disputes. Its sponsors urged that enforcement of the
guarantees of the rights to organize and bargain collectively would be the best method of achieving
industrial peace .... " Archibald Cox et al., LaborLaw Cases andMaterials86-87 (11th ed. 1990).
188. Donna Sockell, The FutureofLaborLaw: A Mismatch Between StatutoryInterpretationand
IndustrialReality?, 30 B.C. L. Rev. 987, 1014 (1989) (noting that an AFL-CIO survey of organizers
estimated that 90 percent of organizing drives in 1982-83 were actively resisted by the employer).
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unionization. This would seriously damage the credibility of any kind of
employee participation program, including those properly limited to
productivity, efficiency, and quality, as well as broader programs created
through collective bargaining. Consequently, repeal or amendment could
have the opposite effect of that intended-participation groups would
become discredited and employees would avoid them wherever possible.
Repeal or amendment of section 8(a)(2) could only be justified if such
action were part of a comprehensive overhaul of our labor laws to
encourage genuine employee participation that is not employer
controlled. For example, one proposal is that every American workplace
above a certain size have an "employee participation committee" that
voices the interests of employees in dealing with management about a
wide range of employment issues."8 9 Even here, many serious technical
questions would have to be resolved. At a minimum, however, this
would require nonunion employers who want to experiment with
employee participation to comply with minimum standards of employee
representation, such as holding secret ballot elections, providing
information and financial resources, and protecting representatives from
reprisal.
Another possibility is to provide for worker councils, workers on
boards of directors, or minority representation, as is found in many
European countries. 9 ' Employee committees might also be established
by statute, with appropriate representation procedures and protection
from reprisal, to consider certain statutory rights such as job safety.' 9' If
any such plans to create truly independent employee participation are
adopted by Congress, it would be a simple matter to exclude such plans
from section 8(a)(2). It is not necessary to repeal or otherwise amend the
statute.

189. See, e.g., Marleen O'Connor, The Human CapitalEra: Reconceptualizing CorporateLaw to
FacilitateLabor-ManagementCooperation,78 Cornell L. Rev. 899, 962 (1993); Paul Weiler & Guy
Mundlak, New Directionsfor the Law of the Workplace, 102 Yale L.J. 1907, 1922 (1993).
190. See, e.g., Clyde Summers, Worker Participation in The U.S. and West Germany: A
Comparative Study from an American Perspective, 28 Am. J. Comp. L. 367 (1980). Professor
Summers has written many creative articles discussing new forms of worker participation, including
An American Perspective of the German Model of Worker Participation,8 Comp. Lab. L.J. 333
(1987); Co-determinationin the United States: A Projection of ProblersandPotentials,4 J. Comp.
Corp. L. & Sec. Reg. 155 (1982); and IndustrialDemocracy: America's Unfulfilled Promise, 28
Clev. St. L. Rev. 29 (1979).
191. For example, proposed legislation would require employers with more than ten employees to
establish safety and health committees involving both management and labor representatives. H.R.
3160, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 201 (1991).

Section 8(a)(2) and Worker Participation
V.

CONCLUSION

Worker participation programs are a vital part of American industry
today, in both the unionized and non-unionized sectors. NLRA section
8(a)(2) does not hamper the development of such programs when they
are legitimately directed toward improvements in productivity,
efficiency, and quality. This section does, however, prohibit employers
from creating employee groups that deal with employers on conditions of
employment. The employer inevitably controls such groups and uses
them to undermine the rights of workers and unions.
Electromationand Du Pont do not inhibit the proper use of employee
committees to improve productivity, quality, and efficiency. No court or
board decision has struck down an employee participation plan aimed at
those goals, provided they do not also establish employer-controlled
groups that deal with conditions of work. Therefore, these decisions do
not require repealing or amending section 8(a)(2).
Amendments to section 8(a)(2) should be considered only as
necessary to accommodate comprehensive labor law reform that would
broadly increase employee representation rights. While there is much to
be considered in the creation of such additional forms of representation,
other industrial countries have achieved broader employee representation
through the use of worker councils, workers on boards of directors,
minority representation, and related schemes. Moreover, the notion of
employee participation committees is worthy of further consideration.
We must, however, approach these changes with great caution, and only
as part of broad labor law reform that would not decrease the right and
ability of employees to obtain adequate representation through labor
organizations that are truly independent.
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